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Introduction: ¶7KHFLW\LVZKDWVRFLHW\OHWVLWEH· 
 
This paper aims to do two things. First, it considers the influence of the 
EXUJHRQLQJ JOREDO ¶VXSHU-ULFK· on contemporary socio-spatialisation 
processes in London in the light of a contemporary re-readinJ RI 3DKO·V
classic volume, Whose City? (Pahl, 1975). Second, it explores if a turn to 
¶ELJGDWD·² in the form of commercial geodemographic classifications ² 
can offer any additional sociological insights.  
 
The original essay ² ¶:KRVH &LW\"· - is a slight piece, essentially an 
extended review of People and Plans by Gans (1968), but it contains an 
initial observation that startles the contemporary reader: 
Intellectuals scorn the neatness and order of skilled-manual-worker 
or lower-middle-class housing in new towns or spec-built estates, 
DQGGHSORUHKXJH ¶LQKXPDQ·EORFNVRI IODWV%XWDW WKHVDPHWLPH
they feel angry or guilty about overcrowding and poverty in Notting 
Hill or Sparkbrook (Pahl, 1975: 1987, our emphasis). 
 
Of all the places he might have chosen in London, as an example of an 
area of deprivation, Notting Hill seems a very surprising choice today. Yet 
in the 1960s it was a neighbourhood that epitomised many of the worst 
aspects of urban poverty. [1] The subsequent fortunes of these two places 
have, obviously, diverged widely. Many of the issues and social problems 
identified in the classic study of the Sparkbrook neighbourhood in 
Birmingham by Rex and Moore (1967) still pertain today, and the area 
stubbornly remains in the top one per cent of the most deprived places in 
England. Notting Hill on the other hand, has become one of the most 
coveted postcodes in the country. At the beginning of 2016, for example, 
the average price of a terraced house in Notting Hill was £3.8 million whilst 
in Sparkbrook it was just £135,000.  
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Notting Hill is just one of a number of neighbourhoods in London that have 
been transformed in recent years by dramatic changes in the global 
distribution of wealth. It is not just neighbourhoods such as Notting Hill that 
KDYH ¶FRPH XS· that are subject to change, eYHQ LQ ¶WUDGLWLRQDOO\ HOLWH·
neighbourhoods (Webber and Burrows, 2016) what we might think of now 
as WKH¶PHUHO\ZHDOWK\· are being challenged by the raw money power of 
the global ¶VXSHU-ULFK·Atkinson et al., 2016a). This phenomenon is not just 
an extension to, or intensification of, ¶VXSHU-JHQWULILFDWLRQ· processes 
(Butler and Lees, 2006); rather LWLVDQ¶XSZDUG·FRORQLVDWLRQ by capital that 
can perhaps best be characterised as the emergence of a plutocratic 
city in which raw money-power increasingly dictates the social, political 
and symbolic landscapes of the urban (Atkinson et al., 2016a; 2016b), in 
which even the most established wealthy neighERXUKRRGV RI /RQGRQ·V
West End (Wilkins, 2013) are subject to fundamental change. Peter York 
(2013; 2015), cultural critic and long-time resident of these areas, has 
recently observed that even in Mayfair ² perhaps the most established of 
elite London communities - the people who now own property are very 
different to a generation ago  
The super-rich«come from absolutely everywhere to live, work and 
trade in twenty-first-century Mayfair. As house buyers, they 
particularly come from Western Europe, Eastern Europe and the 
0LGGOH (DVW«7KH\·UH XVXDOO\ RIWHQ DEVHQWHHV«non-GRPV«7KH WLny 
clutch of Brits in at that level are really non-doms too, defined by 
their tax status and time spent in their various houses and offices 
around the world (York, 2013: 46-47, emphasis in original).  
 
These changes highlight how urban social and economic formations 
reflect epochal changes - as Pahl states in his essay: ¶7KHFLW\LVHVVHQWLDOO\
a social entity ² the product of a particular society at a particular 
WLPH«7KHFLW\LVZKDWVRFLHW\OHWVLWEH· (Pahl, 195: 194). This simple dictum 
thus suggests that in order to better understand the contemporary urban 
condition we would be well advised to take account of broader global 
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social processes, in particular the dramatic changes in global wealth 
inequality witnessed over the last few years (Koh et al., 2016). 
 
Piketty and Pahl 
 
The scale of these changes has been dramatic at the global level. For 
example, Oxfam (2016) document that in 2010 the wealthiest 388 people 
on the planet possessed as much wealth as the poorest half of the world's 
population. By 2012 this figure was 159, in 2014 it was 80, and in 2015 it was 
estimated to be just 62. The most recent annual World Wealth Report 
(2015) produced by Capgemini and RBC Wealth Management for the 
financial services sector calculates that in 2014 there were some 14.6 
million, of what they term, High Net Worth Individuals (HNWIs) ² each with 
$1m or more of investable assets on the planet; a figure significantly 
greater than the 8.6 million reported in 2008 at the time of the global 
financial crisis. Other data nuance the scale and socio-spatial distribution 
of such patterns of inequality, but the overarching message could not be 
clearer: global wealth is now very highly concentrated indeed and likely 
to become even more so.  
 
The cumulative narrative of such reports have recently taken on a new 
significance as the causal roots of such processes have become clearer 
IROORZLQJWKHSXEOLFDWLRQRI3LNHWW\·V PRQXPHQWDOVWXG\ of Capital 
in the Twenty First Century. Few academic texts in the history of the social 
sciences have so rapidly received such academic and popular acclaim 
as this work (Savage, 2014). The analytic, conceptual, political and 
empirical controversies that have accompanied its publication have not 
detracted from its main message: that those with money capital and 
wealth will almost always do better than those seeking an income from 
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work. For Piketty, if ¶r· is the rate of return on capital (very broadly defined) 
and ¶g· is the rate of economic growth, then during periods where r > g 
economic inequality inevitably increases as growth in income derived 
from capital outperforms income derived from other sources, such as 
salaries and wages. For most of the history of capitalism r has indeed been 
greater than g, except for a brief period in the middle of the twentieth 
century. Between about 1930 and the late 1970s g > r but only because of 
what now look to be some unusual FLUFXPVWDQFHV DQ ¶KLVWRULFDO EOLS·
even: two World Wars, the Great Depression, the establishment of 
redistributive welfare states, the growth of the negotiating power of trade 
unions, and a few decades of rapid economic growth. Since the 1980s 
the relation r > g has once again asserted itself at a global level with the 
rate of growth of capital, where dividends are re-invested, greatly 
exceeding the growth of incomes. For Piketty, unless action is taken or 
unless the wealthy spend their returns on capital rather than saving it and 
passing in on to their children, we will see a return to the kind of conditions 
found in the nineteenth century in which the most affluent people in the 
world are the offspring of the existing super-elite; the rich and their 
descendants will get richer and, even if economic growth is sustained, 
concentrations of wealth and ever-greater levels of social inequality will 
continue apace.  
 
From this perspective the development of much of the contemporary 
HPSLULFDOVRFLDOVFLHQFHVRFFXUUHGZLWKLQWKHSHULRGRIWKLV¶KLVWRULFDOEOLS·
(Savage, 2010) in which levels of social inequality ² for the most part at 
least ² were lesseQLQJ7KHWRQHRIWKHHVVD\VFROOHFWHGWRJHWKHULQ3DKO·V
(1975) Whose City? ² all originally written from 1965 onwards ² reflect these 
conditions. Although Pahl is clear at the very outset of the second edition 
of the book that the simple answer to hLVTXHVWLRQZDV¶TXLWHHYLGHQWO\WKH
 5 
FDSLWDOLVWV· 3DKO  , much of what concerns him elsewhere in the 
essays is the question of the extent and efficacy of social policy and 
urban planning in ameliorating the gross social inequalities that might 
have otherwise resulted from such patterns of ownership and control if 
they were not mediated by non-market forces. Central to managing the 
interplay between patterns of capitalist ownership, market forces and a 
largely reformist welfare state were, what he tHUPHG¶XUEDQPDQDJHUV·² 
planners, local government officials, developers, estate agents and so on 
² unified only to the extent that they were able to influence the allocation 
of urban resources and thus mediate recursive relations between what he 
terms, RQVRPHRFFDVLRQV¶VSDWLDOSDWWHUQVDQGVRFLDOSURFHVVHV·DQGRQ
RWKHUV¶XUEDQSURFHVVHVDQGVRFLDOVWUXFWXUH·:ULWLQJMXVWDKHDGRIZKDWLV
now often interpreted as the final death throes of the economic long 
wave of Fordism, Whose City? could easily be interpreted as one of the 
final empirical analyses of the kind of urban spatialisation in the UK that 
pertained just prior to the unleashing of global neoliberalism from the mid-
1970s onwards. 
 
The myriad impacts of neoliberalism on the urban form have, of course, 
been extensively documented (Peck et al., 2013), and the combined 
influence of processes of global marketization, deregulation, privatization, 
individualisation, regeneration and gentrification have become the 
frequent hallmarks of urban life under such conditions. These contexts, in 
which markets are privileged in myriad guises, has also been the bedrock 
upon which, iQ3LNHWW\·V WHUPV WKHKLVWRULFDO UHODWLRQof r > g has been so 
successfully reinstated. Urban and national governments have sought to 
court and boost the fortunes of capital and both patterns of wealth and 
investment have chased these opportunities relentlessly ,I 3DKO·V Whose 
City? ¶bookends· the beginning of this historical reinstatement, as manifest 
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in the urban form, then FlorLGD·V  GHOLEHUDWH" SOD\ RQ WKLV WLWOH ² 
:KR·V <RXU &LW\" ² is a sorry support at the other end, with its indulgent 
guidance to global elites about where best to physically relocate, with no 
or little consideration of how these actions impact upon the wider urban 
fabric. For the very rich and some of the middle-classes cities in which 
capital has been privileged have opened the way for demographic shifts 
predicated on the realization of massive tax and accumulated 
advantages in the property market. As Short (2016) argues, for the mobile 
ULFK¶WKHLU·FLW\LV, in fact, pretty much any urban area that offers the right 
ingredients of under-valorized housing, loose fiscal regimes, personal 
safety, and bundles of established and new cultural infrastructure that 
help to underwrite any possible risks to their investments. As Short (2016) 
shows, many nations have crafted their immigration policies in order to 
compete with each other for what Ley (2010) has labeled ¶PLOOLRQDLUH
PLJUDQWV· 
 
Under the regimes of tKHVDQGVGHVFULEHGE\3DKO¶FDSLWDO·ZDV
the dominant force in understanding urban dynamics, but it was a form of 
capital the bearers of which remained YHU\ PXFK ¶RI· WKH FLWLHV· (or at 
least the nations) in which they invested. Urban capital was 
predominantly under the control of individual and/or institutional actors 
with some interests ² commercial, civic, aesthetic, political, cultural and so 
on ² in the urban fabric and the municipal resources that they enjoyed 
alongside other citizens. To the extent that class conflicts and/or struggles 
over collective consumption existed, as articulated paradigmatically by 
Castells (1977), the assumption was that the geographical reach of such 
strife ² on all sides ² was, for the most part, relatively circumscribed.  
 
Under contemporary conditions this is no longer true of course. Processes 
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of globalization, ideologies of neoliberalism and dramatic technological 
change have entwined in complex ways with huge consequences for 
spatial relations between the ownership and control of capital and its 
urban manifestation. Untethered capital now sloshes across the globe via 
HYHU PRUH FRPSOH[ FRQGXLWV RI GLJLWDO ILQDQFLDO V\VWHPV ¶SDUNLQJ· LWVHOI
only episodically in order to gain advantageous returns on investment in a 
manner relatively unfettered by considerations of spatial belonging or 
social or (even) patrician obligation. The geography of cities such as 
London (our case exemplar here) are being fundamentally altered by 
investment decisions made in Hong Kong, Singapore, China, Malaysia, 
Russia, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, India and so on.  
 
But what of the investors themselves? Where are they? Do they live in the 
places where the investment decisions are located? What sorts of 
attachment to place do they have? Is home where their heart is, or a site 
among many others picked, perhaps by advisers, for their investment 
potential? Perhaps most importantly, what are the consequences for the 
places where they choose to locate their money and/or their households? 
The intensification of the global spatial de-coupling of the location of 
capital investment from the location of those making the investments 
particularly interests us here (Paris, 2016)? :KHUHGRWKHJOREDO¶VXSHU-ULFK·
reside and with what consequences? 
 
Placing the Global Super-Rich 
 
Contemporary academic interest in elites (Birtchnell and Caletrio, 2013; 
6DYDJH DQG :LOOLDPV  DQG WKH ¶VXSHU-ULFK· LQ SDUWLFXODU Hay, 2013; 
Hay and Beaverstock, 2016) has only recently begun to match more 
popular cultural and journalist interest (Frank, 2007; Freeland, 2012; 
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Rothkopf, 2008) in their fortunes and actions. Accompanying the growth in 
academic interest in the super-rich has come a number of well-publicized 
publications from the commercial sector that are also widely utilized in the 
extant social scientific literature in order to provide some crude estimates 
of the extent and distribution of the extremely wealthy across the globe 
(see Beaverstock and Faulconbridge, 2013; Beaverstock and Hay, 2016; 
Koh et al., 2016).  As we have already noted, one of the most popular of 
these, the annual World Wealth Reports (Capgemini and RBC Wealth 
Management, 2015), calculates that in 2014 there were some 14.6 million 
HNWIs distributed around the globe. Of these 14.6 million: 90 per cent held 
assets of between  $1m and $5m; 9 per cent held assets of between $5m 
and $30m; and just 1 per cent (some 133,300) held assets of $30m or more 
(the, so called, Ultra High Net-Worth Individuals (UHNWIs)). The 
geographical distribution of this population of 14.6 million individuals is, 
unsurprisingly, highly concentrated: 4,351,000 in the USA; 2,452,000 in 
Japan; 1,141,000 in Germany; 890,000 in China; and an estimated 550,000 
(up from 527,000 in 2013) in the UK; with France, Switzerland, Canada, 
Australia, Italy, the Netherlands and South Korea following in order of 
HNWI population size.  
 
This paper is primarily concerned with the distribution of super-rich 
residents in urban environments in the UK, London in particular. This is not 
just a parochial focus however 7KH DQQXDO ¶ULFK-OLVWV· SURGXFHG E\ The 
Sunday Times ² based upon an impressive range of investigative 
journalism ² are helpful in identifying particular individuals and families 
within the UK who possess huge amounts of wealth (and are thus an 
important sub-set of the very wealthiest UHNWIs). The Sunday Times 
Magazine (2014) included for the first time DVXSSOHPHQWDU\¶VXSHU-ULFK·OLVW
and suggested that, as of 2014, there were 104 individuals with wealth of 
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more than £1 billion resident in the UK, worth a total of £301 billion. Of 
these four possessed wealth of £10 billion or more: Sri and Gopi Hinduja 
were the wealthiest with an estimated £11.9 billion, followed by Alisher 
Usmanov with £10.65 million, Lakshmi Mittal and his family with £10.25 
billion, and Len Blavatnik with £10 billion. This data also reveals that not 
only does the UK now have more £ billionaires per capita than any other 
country in the world, but that London is now far and away the city with 
the greatest number of sterling billionaires resident globally ² some 72 
(compared to Moscow with 48, New York with 43, San Francisco with 42, 
Los Angeles with 38 and Hong Kong with 34).   
 
Data such as this are very helpful if we are interested in general global 
patterns of wealth or in the fortunes of particular individuals. However, if 
we are interested in the influence that the very wealthy individuals have 
on urban form we clearly need some form of intermediate 
conceptualisation of them as a socio-spatial phenomenon and a more 
granular mapping of their locations within specific urban systems. One 
way forward in this regard might be to rework ¶XSZDUGV· (Burrows, 2016) 
recent empirical work on the middle classes in relation to what has come 
WREHWHUPHGWKH¶VSDWLDOLVDWLRQRIFODVV·3DUNHr et al., 2007; Savage et al., 
2005).   
 
Parker et al. (2007: 904) observe that one might expect that that this 
notion of social class as an increasingly spatialised phenomena would 
derive from a sociological lineage that begins with the Chicago school of 
urban ecology (Park et al. 1925) and then tracks through the 
aforementioned urban sociology of Rex and Moore (1967) and other work 
by Pahl (1970), RQ¶KRXVLQJFODVVHV·+RZHYHUWKLVLVQRWVR It is, in fact, yet 
another manifestation of the influence of Bourdieu (1984) on 
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contemporary social class analysis; his concepts of ¶FDSLWDO·¶KDELWXV·DQG
¶ÀHOG· Dre used as a means of interpreting the preferences, tastes, 
strategies and actions of various fractions of the metropolitan middle 
classes. This ¶WXUQ· WR %RXUGLHX KDV been especially evident in the work 
of analysts such as Bridge, Butler and their colleagues (Bacqué et al., 
2015; Bridge, 2006; Butler with Robson 2003), but especially Savage et al. 
(2005). In a much quoted articulation of the thesis Savage et al. (2005: 
207) write that: 
2QH·V UHVLGHQFH LV D FUXFLDO SRVVLEO\ WKH FUXFLDO LGHQWLÀHU RI ZKR
you are. The sorting processes by which people chose to live in 
certain places and others leave is at the heart of contemporary 
battles over social distinction. Rather than seeing wider social 
identities as arising out of the Àeld of employment it would be more 
promising to examine their relationship to residential location.  
 
For Savage et al. (2005: 9) this relates to the observation that people are 
¶comfortable· when there is a correspondence between ¶habitus· and 
¶Àeld· 
[O]therwise people feel ill at ease and seek to move ² socially and 
spatially ² so that their discomfort is relieved«mobility is driven as 
SHRSOH ZLWK WKHLU UHODWLYHO\ À[HG KDELWXV ERWK PRYH EHWZHHQ
Àelds«DQG PRYH WR SODFHV ZLWKLQ ÀHOGV ZKHUH WKH\ IHHO PRUe 
comfortable. 
 
6XFK¶FKRLFHV·DERXWZKHUHWROLYHDSSHDUWREHVWURQJO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWK
all manner of other socio-cultural variables and, as such, the approach is 
part of a broader move to develop ¶FXOWXUDOFODVVDQDO\VLV·%HQQHWWet al., 
2008); a form of analysis that takes patterns of cultural distinction, tastes, 
values and so on seriously without seeing them simply as epiphenomena 
of class positioning within the social relations of production. Such an 
approach has much to offer analytically, and techniques such as multiple 
correspondence analysis (MCA) demonstrate time and time again that ² 
in an abstract conceptual space ² cultural tastes and preferences often 
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cluster together closely and correspond to clear social class differences 
(Bennett et al., 2008). However, accessing appropriate data allowing 
anything approaching a precise and more concrete spatial mapping of 
VXFK¶FXOWXUDOFODVVHV· is much harder to come by. Even mega-scale web 
2.0 enabled surveys (Savage et al., 2013; 2015) are unable to offer 
DQ\WKLQJPRUHWKDQDYHU\FUXGH¶PDSSLQJ· (Cunningham and Savage, 
2015) and although census statistics are of some use in this DVSLUDWLRQ¶WR
PDS· WKH ten-year periodicity of the data and the crudity of the 
FDWHJRULHVXVHGRIWHQPHDQV WKDW ¶VPDOOSRSXODWLRQV· VXFKDV WKHupper 
echelons of the contemporary global bourgeoisie (to put it in very stark 
terms) become lost in plain sight. Other specialized data sources have 
also been explored (Hennig and Dorling, 2012)EXWHYHQKHUHRQO\¶FLW\·
level differences are ascertainable.  
 
So what of the possibilities afforded by methodological innovations 
resulting from tKH VXSSRVHG WXUQ WR ¶ELJ GDWD· (Burrows, 2016)? Are the 
super-rich able to circumnavigate the algorithmic gaze of, for example, 
the commercial geodemographics industry? It would seem not and, 
although far from perfect, such data ² RULJLQDWLQJ IURP ¶FRPPHUFLDO
VRFLRORJ\· %XUURZV DQG *DQH  UDWKHU WKDQ from the state or the 
academy - provides us with a reasonably nuanced sense of the 
geographies of the global super-rich in the UK and, indeed, in many other 
countries as well (Burrows, 2016). 
 
Understanding Geodemographic Classifications 
 
ACORN, Mosaic and a number of other such systems attribute a 
geodemographic classification to every residential address in the UK using 
a diverse set of spatially referenced data sourced from commercial and 
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official sources. Initially these systems classified people on the basis of the 
attributes of the postcode in which they lived, using a mix of census 
statistics for census output areas and other data sources aggregated at 
the more detailed level of the unit postcode (Harris et al., 2005). [2] 
However, from 2006 vendors of these systems have released variants of 
their classifications which attribute different classification codes to 
different households or individuals within a single postcode where known 
person RU KRXVHKROG OHYHO GDWD VXJJHVW D SHUVRQ RU KRXVHKROG·V
character would be better described by a different classification than the 
one attributed to the postcode in which they live.  
 
The Mosaic classification, promoted by Experian, [3] uses over 400 
different data values held against almost 49 million adults in the UK to 
optimize the classification which it attributes to each one. Some of these 
attributes are held at the person or household level, others at the 
postcode or higher spatial level. There is not always a one-to-one 
correspondence between a person and an address however, as some 
SHRSOHDUH¶DVVRFLDWHG·ZLWKPRUHWKDQRQHresidence ² students, people 
with two or more homes, or overseas owners of a property visited only 
occasionally are all examples.  The Mosaic classification used in this 
paper, is the one which was originally released in 2008, but is based on 
data from 2010, and the spatial level at which it is used here is the unit 
postcode.  It classifies each postcode into one of 67 different ¶Wypes·, 
whilst the ACORN system classifies them into 62. The statistical procedures 
that each uses to cluster and then classify each address are proprietary 
and this is one of the main reasons why such systems have sometimes not 
proved popular with academics. Not only that but the veracity of the 
classifications are not primarily driven by social scientific sensibilities; they 
¶ZRUN·only in the sense that they identify highly nuanced socio-economic 
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and cultural differences between different postcodes that have proven 
¶useful· to a wide range of commercial, public sector, and political bodies 
(Uprichard et al., 2009). [4]  
 
For ACORN, addresses most likely to be associated with the very 
wealthiest people in the UK are grouped together under the heading of 
¶/DYLVK /LIHVW\OHV· ZKLFK DUH IXUWKHU GLIIHUHQWLDWHG LQWR 3 sub-groups: 
¶([FOXVLYH(QFODYHV·¶0HWURSROLWDQ0RQH\·and ¶/DUJH+RXVH/X[XU\·The 
Mosaic system on the other hand, groups the very wealthy together under 
the auspices of the ¶$OSKD7HUULWRU\·RIZKLFKWKHUHDUHFRQVLGHUHGWR be 
IRXUGLVWLQFW W\SHV ¶*OREDO3RZHU%URNHUV· ¶9RLFHVRI$XWKRULW\· ¶%XVLQHVV
&ODVV·DQG¶6HULRXV0RQH\· Although such labels may also not always be 
to the taste of social scientific sensibilities the descriptions of the statistical 
clusters upon which they are based have often been found to correspond 
extremely well with more ethnographic descriptions of the 
neighbourhoods they seek to describe (Butler with Robson, 2003; Parker et 
al., 2007; Savage et al., 2005). 
 
7KH¶$OSKD7HUULWRU\· 
 
7KH ¶$OSKD 7HUULWRU\· (AT) as a whole is described in the Mosaic 
documentation as groups of people with substantial wealth who live in 
the most sought after neighbourhoods in the UK. However, as we have 
noted, the group is internally differentiated into four quite distinct clusters. 
¶*OREDO 3RZHU %URNHUV· *3%V DUH GHVFULEHG DV wealthy and ambitious 
high flyers living predominantly in the very best urban flats. ¶9RLFHV RI
$XWKRULW\· 9R$ DUH GHVFULEHG as influential ¶thought leaders· living 
predominantly in comfortable and spacious city homes. Members of the 
¶%XVLQHVV&ODVV·%&DUHGHVFULEHGas business leaders, often approaching 
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retirement and living in large family homes in the most prestigious 
residential suburbs)LQDOO\¶6HULRXV0RQH\·6eMo) is described as families 
with considerable wealth living predominantly in large, exclusive 
detached houses in outer suburban areas and with large amounts of 
disposable income.  
 
In addition to these top-level summary descriptions of the distinctive 
features of each of these wealthy geodemographic types Experian 
provides a plethora of other measures that distinguishes each Mosaic 
type from the others. [5] Each of these geodemographic (ideal) types 
thus attempt to describe the specificities of particular socio-economic, 
cultural, generational, political, and perhaps even affective territorial 
fields. Thus rather than having to rely upon measures based upon the 
spatial overlaying of a range of more or less appropriate variables ² 
average house prices, average incomes, property types, demographics 
and so on ² a geodemographic approach allows us to conceptualize 
and measure territories as possessing particular amalgams of a wide 
range of measures which, in combination, often possess a range of 
emergent properties not otherwise readily decipherable (Burrows and 
Gane, 2006); they could then be thought of as attempts to operationalize 
the granular socio-spatLDO ¶FRPSRXQGV· WKDW UHVXOW from the variable 
historical and political interplay of the elemental exigencies of affective, 
cultural, economic, environmental and social life. 
 
The 550,000 HNWIs resident in the UK identified in the latest World Wealth 
Report are, we contend, highly likely to live within neighbourhoods with 
SRVWFRGHV ORFDWHG ZLWKLQ WKLV RYHUDOO ¶$OSKD 7HUULWRU\· LQ WKH 0RVDLF
schema; however they are most likely to be concentrated in areas 
GRPLQDWHGE\¶*OREDO3RZHU%URNHUV·$FURVVWKH8.DVa whole, in 2010, 
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we can locate some 1,759,984 adults associated with addresses in the 
¶$OSKD 7HUULWRU\· but, ZLWKLQ WKLV RQO\  LGHQWLILHG DV ¶*OREDO 3RZHU
%URNHUV· ,IZHDUH LQWHUHVWHG LQ WKHJHRGHPRJUDSKLFVRI WKH ¶VXSHU-ULFK·
then postcodes associated with these 144,553 might be thought of as 
offering us the most intense concentrations of such people, whilst a focus 
RQ WKH ¶$OSKD 7HUULWRU\· DV D ZKROH ZLOO SURYLGH XV ZLWK D EURDGHU
indication of where such people are most likely to reside.  
 
We might attempt to describe what this data reveals by starting at the 
level of the UK as a whole and then progressively drilling down towards 
ever more proximate levels of analysis. Table 1 shows the distribution of all 
4 AT types across the different countries and regions of the UK. A number 
of patterns are immediately evident. First, those classified as the AT as a 
whole are very unevenly distributed; they are not far short of being three 
times more likely to be found in Greater London than they are in the UK as 
a whole and they are almost one and a half-times more likely to be found 
in the rest of the South East. This disproportionate preponderance of the 
AT in Greater London and the rest of the South East can perhaps best be 
visualized via a cartogram ² see Figure 1 - in which each spatial unit has 
been redrawn to reflect its proportionate AT population.[6] It is clear that 
the South East in general, London in particular and core areas of west and 
north London specifically are the zones that dominate the purview of the 
most wealthy individuals in the UK with large swathes of the rest of the 
nation, for all intents and purposes, invisible. Second, the spatial 
distributions of the four types identified within the AT are also markedly 
different. The GPBs are overwhelmingly resident within Greater London 
(over 95 per cent of them). Almost one-half of all those classified as VoA 
are also based in Greater London. Those classified as members of the BC 
and SeMo types are more widely distributed across the UK but, again, are 
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more likely to be based in London or, even more likely, in the rest of the 
South East.  
- Table 1 About Here ² 
 
- Figure 1 About Here ² 
 
Given our focus here we might next examine the spatial distribution of the 
AT population within Greater London. Our data suggests that we will find 
some 641,777 such adults (36.5 per cent of the total for the UK), of these: 
137,727 are classified as GPBs (95. 3 per cent of the total in the UK); 
278,825 as VoA (47.1 per cent); 157,540 as BC (21.7 per cent); and 67,685 
as SeMo (22.8 per cent). Again, and not surprisingly, the distribution of this 
population within Greater London is anything but even, as shown in Table 
2. Those classified as GPBs have a strong preference to be resident in a 
small cluster of postcode areas: SW (37.5 per cent); W (37.4 per cent); and 
NW (19 per cent). Those classified as VoA, on the other hand, are more 
widely distributed but with particular concentrations in N, KT (Kingston) 
and HA (Harrow). Those classified as BC are particularly well represented 
in KT but also with a strong presence in HA and CR (Croydon). Finally, 
SeMo also has a strong preference for KT but also for the SW and a smaller 
presence in W. [7] 
 
- Table 2 About Here ² 
 
Moving to an even more detailed level of analysis ² that of postcode 
districts ² we can examine the numbers and concentrations of our most 
wealthy and most London-centric AT type, the GPBs; the territories in 
which they leave their residential mark are surely at the very heart of 
¶3LNHWW\YLOOH· ² a city characterized by large numbers of new zones for 
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those benefitting from JOREDO ¶SDWULPRQLDO FDSLWDOLVP·. To talk of 
¶Pikettyville· is then to conjure up an image of an urban system that has 
become hardwired to adopting, channeling and inviting excesses of 
social and economic capital in search of a space in which the rich not 
only find safe haven but are also privileged by the kind of property and 
income tax regimes and wider economic climate that allows them to 
thrive on their capital investments, while the wider city experiences some 
of the most challenging economic conditions since the early twentieth 
century (Atkinson et al., 2016b).  
 
Table 3 shows the postcode districts in central London where the greatest 
numbers of the GPBs can be found. Within these ¶top ten· areas some 
84,171 adults classified as GPBs can be associated with these addresses. 
This figure represents over 61 per cent of all those classified as GPBs in 
Greater London. These then are the very core territories of the London 
¶VXSHU-ULFK· Well over 10,000 adults can be found in each of Belgravia 
(14,018), Chelsea (13,112), Hampstead (12,029) and Kensington (11,568). 
However, the greatest concentrations can be found in Kensington (58.0 
per cent of its population), Chelsea (56.6 per cent) and South Kensington 
(50.9 per cent). In these three core areas of the Alpha Territory over one-
half of the adult populations are some of the wealthiest people on the 
planet. 
 
- Table 3 About Here ² 
 
Below this level of analysis individual postcodes belonging to the different 
types can also be mapped in order to show the Mosaic type that 
predominates on a street-by-street basis. This not only allows for the 
visualization of the complex ecology of elite-wealth in relation to other 
 18 
cultural class spatialisations but also for the precise mapping of streets and 
other residential developments LQ ZKLFK WKH ¶VXSHU-ULFK· overwhelmingly 
reside; spaces of both ultimate global caché and rare positional goods: 
Kensington Palace Gardens; Egerton Crescent; The Bishops Avenue; 
Cadogan Square; Prince Consort Road; Drayton Gardens; St James's 
Place; Eaton Square; Lancaster Gate; Blenheim Crescent; Elgin Crescent; 
Hyde Park Gardens; and the rest.  
 
We can illustrate this by returning to where we began ² Notting Hill. Figure 
2 shows a detailed mapping of unit postcodes in the area. The 
neighborhood is now dominated by those classified as GPBs (the light 
dots) with a small smattering of SeMo (the dark dots). This is not to say that 
households from other geodemographic types do not also reside here. 
But it does mean that they are nowhere within a majority within any of the 
postcodes shown on the map.      
 
- Figure 2 About Here - 
 
Concluding Discussion 
 
Mapping the ¶Alpha Territory· in London is, at best, a pragmatic exercise. 
We have used data originally constructed for the needs of the 
commercial sector because we can find no other viable alternative within 
the academy that would facilitate such a detailed socio-spatial analysis 
RIWKH¶VXSHU-ULFK· However, the classification used is clearly not ideal and 
so is probably best thought of as, what Blumer (1954: 7) defines as, a 
sensitizing conceptualisation LQWKDWLWSURYLGHVXVZLWK¶a general sense of 
reference and guidance in approaching empirical 
instances«>DQG@«merely suggest[s] directions aORQJ ZKLFK WR ORRN· So 
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ZHPLJKWQRZKDYHDEHWWHULGHDRIZKHUHWKH¶VXSHU-ULFK·UHVLGHEXWZH
still need a much better analytic understanding of their role and 
functioning in contemporary urban life. There are a number of different 
considerations that might inform the development of  - to keep using the 
language of Blumer ² a more definitive conceptualisation of the 
specificities of life in a plutocratic city.  
 
First, and most importantly, ato repeat Pahl (1975: 1), it is still ¶TXLWH
evidently the capitDOLVWV· ZKR RZQ RXU FLWLHV. However, today that 
influence is ever more emphatic. 3DKO·VHDUOLHUSURJQRVHVDERXWWKHXUEDQ
as a space for capital remains not only intact but is now much more 
aggressively pursued (Atkinson et al., 2016a; 1016b). If the city of the 1970s 
was largely a product of struggles between local capital and labour, 
often over issues of ¶collective consumption·, today the balance of power 
has changed decisively as the city becomes a site of active plunder by 
global capital (Merrifield, 2014); by no means all of it legitimate (Platt, 
2015; Transparency International, 2015).  
 
Second, as the number of HNWIs increases in the UK ² there were 441,000 
in 2011 compared to the 550,00 in 2014 ² we need to better understand 
what the drivers of their neighbourhood choices are, and what the 
implications of these are for existing residences. The poor, the working 
classes, the lower middle classes and the middle classes (Butler and Lees, 
2006) have each, in succession, experienced displacement in London. A 
truly plutocratic city, we might suggest, is one in which such displacement 
EHJLQVWRLPSLQJHXSRQWKH¶PHUHO\ZHDOWK\·² the upper middle classes ² 
as well. We can certainly find potentially prefigurative instances where 
conflicts between the establisKHG ¶PHUHO\ ZHDOWK\· DQG ¶VXSHU-ULFK·
¶LQFRPHUV· DUH becoming manifest. For example, in a recent study of 
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Highgate in North London ² an affluent neighbourhood hitherto 
dominated by the VoA geodemographic type ² we discovered that 
¶VXSHU-ULFK· households moving to the area had little interest in the 
community, the history or the aesthetics of the place; they moved there 
because that was where they could find the type of house that met their 
exacting specifications. This led to conflicts. They were: 
«generally impatient of instrumeQWV RI ORFDO DXWKRULW\ FRQWURO«the 
requirement to respect a historical aesthetic is experienced as an 
onerous and unreasonable restriction on individual 
freedom«Following on from this is conflict over the importance of 
the natural environment, over trees, which can easily obstruct 
proposed property extensions, gardens, which have modest 
recreational value for many incomers, and the sightlines between 
houses«7KHWKLUGVRXUFHRIFRQIOLFWLVWKHDWWLWXGHWRZDrds the local 
community itself«WKH UHOXFWDQFH RI PDQ\ GHYHORSHUV WR
acknowledge their identity publicly and to consult with 
representatives oI WKH ORFDO FRPPXQLW\ HVWUDQJHV>WKHP@«from 
established elites and entrenches conflicts (Webber and Burrows, 
2015: 12-13) 
 
Third, as Peter York explains, it is not just the super-rich as house buyers that 
are the issue. He points out, by way of example, how the built 
environment in Mayfair has been slowly transformed by, what he terms, 
WKH¶PRQH\PHQ· who surround them; many properties have been quietly 
repurposed to support the financial needs of the über-wealthy.  
The other overlapping players«are people who work 
LQ«>WKH@«KXJHEXW VHFUHWLYH ILQDQFHVHFWRU0D\IDLU LV WKHZRUOG·V
¶VHFRQG &LW\· RI KHGJH IXQGV SULYDWH HTXLW\ ILUPV DQG ¶IDPLO\
offLFHV· %XW XQOLNH WKH 6TXDUH 0LOH«WKH 0D\IDLU &LW\ LV
GLVFUHHW«0D\IDLU KDV EHHQ XWWHUO\ WUDQVIRUPHG RQ D UDWKHU TXLHW
basis over the last fifteen years. Little companies have floors in 
anonymous, upgraded blocks. Some work behind hollowed-out 
Georgian facades with built-out, built-on backs, 40 foot rooms 
where you least expect them (York, 2013: 47-49, emphasis in 
original). 
 
York (2013: 49-50) is, justifiably, critical of the lack of attention that the 
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social sciences have, hitherto, paid to this new financial infrastructure 
developing in the heart of the West End. Private equity houses are 
businesses that acquire other businesses ² often very big businesses, and 
we know something about them at least (Gospel et al., 2014). Family 
offices, however, are more mysterious entities. York, again, explains:  
,I \RX·UH UHDOO\ ULFK \RX ZDUUDQW DQ RIILFH7KH JOREDO ULFK
LQFUHDVLQJO\OLYHLQ0D\IDLU«7KHSHRSOHZKRORRNDIWHUWKHLUPRQH\
² some of them astonishingly rich too ² ZRUNWKHUH«0D\IDLUDQG6W
-DPHV·V DUH DEsolutely humming with very superior butler types ² 
many of them well-EUHG%ULWV«:H·YHEHFRPHYHU\JRRGDWORRNLQJ
DIWHUWKHULFK«enabling DZD\VPRRWKLQJWKHSDWK7KH\·UHHDUQLQJ
a very fair whack ² as family-RIILFH PHQ«EXW WKH\·UH QRW«WKH
principals, the owners, the definably super-ULFK WKHPVHOYHV 7KH\·UH
super-help. The driving force is somewhere else, usually somewhere 
offshore (York, 2013: 52-54, emphasis in original) 
 
What would Pahl make of such developments in London today? Whose 
city is it now? The global excesses of wealth, focused upon such a small 
fragment of the global population, now find spatial expression in many of 
the neighbourhoods of central London. This combination of privileging 
capital over prevailing incomes and economic growth appears to mark a 
new epoch in London, and other global cities, and a malaise from which 
GLVVHQWDQGVRFLDODQJHULVLQFUHDVLQJ3LNHWW\·V(2014) measured proposals 
for significant taxes on wealth appear to be one of the few, increasingly 
popular, means by which ownership of the city might begin to swing more 
firmly in line with the wider majority of its residents and a more democratic, 
less plutocratic, urbanism restored. But, of course, to echo Pahl: ¶>W@KHFLW\
LVZKDWVRFLHW\OHWVLWEH· 
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Notes in the Text  
 
1. An excellent account of the changing fortunes of Notting Hill is 
provided in the BBC2 TV series The Secret History of Our Streets. 
 
2. The postcode is structured hierarchically, supporting four levels of 
geographic unit: Areas (for example, PO) of which there are 
currently 124; Districts (for example PO15) of which there are 
currently 3,114; Sectors (for example PO15 5) of which there are 
currently 12,381; and Unit Postcodes (for example PO15 5RR) of 
which there are currently approximately 1.75 million tKDWDUH¶OLYH· 
 
3. Experian plc is a FTSE 100 company.  
 
4. Harris et al. (2005: 147-184) provide a detailed technical account of 
how such classifications are built. Space precludes a full 
consideration of other objections made against the use of 
geodemographic classifications in academic social research, but 
Webber et al. (2015) provides responses to a number. 
 
5. Full details can be found via the following URLs. On the AT as a 
whole see: http://goo.gl/sKClat. For GPBs: http://goo.gl/fHuRcc. For 
VoA: http://goo.gl/H8YFQA. For BC: http://goo.gl/YPr82C. For SeMo: 
http://goo.gl/1L4eyM. 
 
6. Thanks to David Rhodes for producing this. 
 
7. A list of all postcode areas and a map can be found here: 
http://www.postcodes-uk.com/postcode-areas. 
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7DEOH¶$OSKD7HUULWRU\·'LVWULEXWLRQE\*RYHUQPHQW2IILFH5HJLRQ 
GOR 
GPBs 
(%) 
VoA 
(%) 
BC 
(%) 
SeMo 
(%) 
All AT 
(%) 
Non AT 
(%) 
Ratio 
AT/ 
Non-
AT 
All 
(%) 
North 1.7 2.5 0.9 4.5 2.1 4.1 51.2 4.0 
Yorks Humber 0.0 3.6 4.1 5.6 3.9 9.2 42.4 9.0 
North West 0.0 4.2 7.1 15.0 6.9 11.2 61.6 11.1 
West Midlands 0.0 3.7 6.9 7.7 5.4 8.7 62.1 8.6 
East Midlands 0.0 1.9 2.9 2.7 2.3 6.3 36.5 6.1 
East Anglia 0.0 2.3 1.0 0.6 1.3 4.2 31.0 4.1 
South West 0.9 4.5 3.7 4.2 3.8 10.0 38.0 9.8 
South East 0.2 16.9 36.7 19.9 24.2 17.0 142.4 17.3 
Greater London 95.3 47.1 21.7 22.8 36.5 13.1 278.6 14.0 
Scotland 1.8 8.4 10.1 15.0 9.7 8.5 114.1 8.6 
Wales 0.2 3.7 3.5 0.8 2.8 4.6 60.9 4.5 
N Ireland 0.0 1.2 1.3 1.3 1.2 3.0 40.0 3.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N. 144,553 592,294 725,768 297,369 1,759,984 46,781,838  48,541,822 
Base: Adults with a permanent address in postcode districts within the UK 
Source: Analysis of Mosaic data, 2010 
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7DEOH¶$OSKD7HUULWRU\·'LVWULEXWLRQ$FURVV*UHDWHU/RQGRQE\3RVWFRGH$UHD 
Postcode Area 
GPBs 
(%) 
VoA 
(%) 
BC 
(%) 
SeMo 
(%) 
All AT 
(%) 
Non AT 
(%) 
Ratio  
AT/ 
Non-AT 
All 
(%) 
BR (Bromley) 0.0 6.6 11.2 1.6 5.8 3.1 187.1 3.4 
CR (Croydon) 0.0 3.7 11.6 1.8 4.6 4.3 107.0 4.3 
DA (Dartford) 0.0 0.7 2.5 0.1 0.9 5.1 17.6 4.7 
E (East) 0.3 2.9 0.3 0.3 1.4 10.3 13.6 9.5 
EC (East City) 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 25.0 0.4 
EN (Enfield) 0.0 4.4 4.7 4.5 3.5 3.8 92.1 3.8 
HA (Harrow) 0.0 9.7 13.0 4.7 7.9 4.6 171.7 4.9 
IG (Ilford) 0.0 4.2 4.5 4.5 3.4 3.4 100.0 3.4 
KT (Kingston upon Thames) 0.2 11.7 27.4 25.4 14.5 5.3 273.6 6.2 
N (North) 3.7 15.7 4.9 10.0 9.8 8.7 112.6 8.8 
NW (North West) 19.0 7.5 2.4 10.9 9.1 6.0 151.7 6.3 
RM (Romford) 0.0 0.7 3.8 0.3 1.3 6.0 21.7 5.5 
SE (South East) 0.7 4.4 0.6 2.1 2.5 11.7 21.4 10.8 
SM (Sutton) 0.0 2.8 6.7 0.4 2.9 2.4 120.8 2.5 
SW (South West) 37.5 9.2 0.9 24.1 14.8 10.0 148.0 10.5 
TW (Twickenham) 0.3 7.8 3.5 2.2 4.5 4.5 100.0 4.5 
UB (Southall) 0.0 1.4 1.7 0.6 1.1 4.0 27.5 3.7 
W (West) 37.4 6.7 0.4 6.5 11.7 5.9 198.3 6.5 
WC (West City) 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 25.0 0.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
N. 137,727 278,825 157,540 67,685 641,777 6,148,065  6,789,842 
Base: Adults with a permanent address in postcode districts within Greater London 
Source: Analysis of Mosaic data, 2010 
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Table 3 London Post Code Districts with the Largest Number of Adults ClassifLHGDV¶*OREDO3RZHU%URNHUV· 
Rank  Number of Global Power 
Brokers 
Concentration 
1 London SW1 Belgravia 14,018 29.6% 
2 London SW3 Chelsea 13,112 56.6% 
3 London NW3 Hampstead 12,029 26.9% 
4 London W8 Kensington 11,568 58.0% 
5 London W2 Paddington 9,493 20.7% 
6 London SW7 South Kensington 9,066 50.9% 
7 London W11 Notting Hill 8,916 30.9% 
8 London W1 West End 6,806 26.5% 
9 London NW8 St Johns Wood 6,555 22.7% 
10 London W14 West Kensington 4,637 14.7% 
 Base: Adults with a permanent address in postcode districts within Greater London 
 Source: Analysis of Mosaic data, 2010 
 31 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
A Cartogram Showing the Spatial Distribution of the Alpha Territory 
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Figure 2 
 
The Postcode Locations of Global Power Brokers in Notting Hill   
 
 
 
 
